The text of Directive No. 12 is not available. It probably did not go beyond the High Command Of The Army. Its character can be deduced from two entries in the diaries of Jodl and Halder for 18th May. According to Jodl:

                The High Command Of The Army has failed to I carry out the intention to build up a southern flank with the utmost speed. Infantry divisions have continued to move westward instead of switching to the southwest. Thus 10th Armoured Division and 2nd and 29th Motorised Divisions are still tied down protecting the flank. Commander In Chief Army and General Halder were immediately called in and were ordered in the sharpest manner to take the necessary steps at once ..... I also issued an amending order to the Directive. This order switches 1st Mountain Division and the rear elements of 4th Army to the attacks in the south and southwest.

                Halder's account is fuller:

                The Leader has an unnecessary anxiety about the southern flank ..... He is absolutely opposed to the continuation of operations towards the west, let alone the southwest, and still clings to the northwestern idea. This led to a difference of opinion in The Leader's Headquarters between The Leader on the one hand and the Commander In Chief and myself on the other. A Directive was issued on this occasion which is a confirmation in writing of our conversation which took place at 1000 hrs. Conversations between the Commander In Chief and Colonel General von Rundstedt, and my conversation with Salmuth, produced the effects which The Leader desired (sharp switch of forward divisions to the southwest, main body of motorised forces to be ready to move to the west).