The Leader And Supreme Commander Of The Armed Forces.
Headquarters. 14th May, 1939. 5 copies
Directive No. 11
1. The progress of the offensive to date shows that the enemy has failed to appreciate in time the basic idea of our operations. He continues to throw strong forces against the line Namur-Antwerp and appears to be neglecting the sector facing Army Group A.
2. This fact and the swift forcing of the Meuse River crossing in the sector of Army Group A have established the first essentials for a thrust in all possible strength north of the Aisne and in a northwesterly direction, as laid down in Directive No. 10. Such a thrust might produce a major success. It is the task of forces engaged north of the line Liège-Namur to deceive and hold down the greatest number of enemy forces by attacking them with their own resources.
3. On the northern flank the Dutch Army has shown itself capable of a stronger resistance than had been supposed. For political and military reasons, this resistance must be broken quickly. It is the task of the Army, by moving strong forces from the south in conjunction with an attack against the eastern front, to bring about the speedy fall of Fortress Holland.
4. All available motorised divisions will be transferred to the operational area of Army Group A as soon as possible.
Armoured and motorised divisions of Army Group B will also be switched to the left flank as soon as there are no further prospects of effective operations in their own sector and as the situation allows.
5. The task of the Air Force is to concentrate strong offensive and defensive forces for action, with the focal point at Army Group A, in order to prevent the transfer of enemy reinforcements to the front and to give direct support to our own forces.
In addition the rapid reduction of Fortress Holland will be assisted by the deliberate weakening of forces hitherto operating ahead of 6th Army.
6. The Navy will operate against sea traffic in the Hoofden and in the Channel as opportunity offers.